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Luxembourg  was  able  to  develop,  enlarge  and  improve  its  corporatist  welfare  system  with 
Scandinavian standards, creating one of, if not the most substantial regime in the EU/OECD. Several 
aspects are outstanding: expansion and improvement took place over the last two decades; important 
reserves for the pension insurance allowed replacement rates being on top within OECD countries; 
corporatist elements had been reduced in favour of a higher impact of the State; defamilzation took 
place,  thus  a  significant  recalibration.  There  is  no  experience  of  cutbacks  or  significant  cost 
containment measures leading to losses and a higher responsibility for the insured. 
 The question is, how did Luxembourg manage to increase and improve its welfare offer, while other 
developed countries have had to cutback since the 1970s? And what was the impact of the financial 
crisis on welfare policies up to the end of 2009. 
 
Luxembourg has the most regulated labour market within OECD, but also the most diversified in 
terms  of  migration  and  cross  border  movements.  Two  factors  are  commonly  considered  putting 
welfare systems under pressure: globalisation and ageing effects. Luxembourg avoided the last one 
via its permanently rejuvenating immigration and cross border movement:  age- and family-member-
dependency ratios are extremely low for cross border commuters compared to those of residents. The 
extremely transnationalised labour force might be considered as an implicit „globalising‟ answer. This 
small  nation-state  used  its  sovereignty  taking  advantage  of  the  imbrication  of  national  and 
transnational (EU) law: crossers contribute fully, but are not fully entitled to benefits.  Immigration is 
sometimes considered to be a threat to the sustainability of welfare schemes; in Luxembourg however 
immigrants and crossers were the main factors for expansion.  
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1.  Effects of the Financial crisis on corporatist and universalistic welfare model: the case of 
Luxembourg
1 
Luxembourg has developed a generous and broad welfare regime over the last 100 years which has 
seen further important changes during the last two decades. Luxembourg was able to develop, enlarge 
and improve its welfare system, creating one of, if not the most substantial regime in the EU/OECD. 
During the last two decades, authorities have introduced new insurances and benefits such as parental 
leave in 1998, the care insurance in 1998, two other benefits for the elderly in 1998, a labour market 
maintenance measure (“incapacit￩ de travail”, 2002), a minimum income scheme for disabled persons 
(2003) and financial help for child care (“ch￨ques-service” introduced in 2009). On top of these new 
measures, standards have been considerably improved (Kieffer, 2008 and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009) 
and  an  important  service  sector  has  been  developped.  These  developments  contrast  with  the 
retrenchment policies observed in other states (EU,OECD) (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995).  Until now, 
authorities have avoided serious cutbacks - an outstanding situation. 
Some elements should be briefly highlighted before starting with the main sections. 
Luxembourg‟s economy experienced a long period of a „virtuous spiral‟, which relied upon a strong 
foreign and mainly a highly qualified labour force (Schuller, 2002). The following advantages have 
contributed to the „spiral‟ evolution: a small economy with the opportunity to adapt quickly, to offer 
companies easy going relations with the administration, Luxemburg's status as a sovereign State, 
which grants it entitlement to define its own specific legislation and policies aimed at the use of 
niches, a specific knowledge, the attraction of a substantial immigration, etc.  With regard to the 
competitiveness of the economy, the following elements should be highlighted: indirect labour cost is 
low, thus it weighs less on companies‟ budgets and produces high net wages. However gross wages 
are high and automatic adaptation
2 takes place and is  currently the main subject of political debate 
between employers and employees - in terms of retrenchment policies. The government contributes to 
social security insurances and benefits (table 1) to a higher extent than neighbouring member -states 
(MS), in a similar way as Scandinavian authorities do. Hence, some benefits are entirely financed by 
tax revenue.  However, net wages are high
3, amongst the highest within EU (and OECD), and more so 
those of the public sector. The automatic adaptation and the high wages are the critical points 
highlighted by the employers in terms of a loss of comp etitiveness, whilst unions defend the 
corporatist, highly protected legal framework and welfare model with outstanding standards, pleading 
against any type of „Sozialabbau‟ (dismantling of the welfare system).  
                                                           
1 This paper had been presented at the EZA conference “The State of the Welfare State” on  19/20 April2010 in 
University of Leuven under the direction of Prof Jozef Pacolet and will be published by J. Pacolet in “The State 
of the Welfare State”.  Vanessa Di Bartolomeo, Franz Clément, Antoine Haag, Guy Schuller and Adrien Thomas 
provided precious critcism.  
2 Automatic increase of wages due to inflation via index calculation. 




Luxembourg‟s labour market provides on the one hand the most regulated corporatist legal framework 
(Haag, 2010) and is on the other the most transnationalised: two thirds are foreigners and one third are 
nationals. A steady net inflow of immigrants and a continous increase of cross border commuters over 
the last decades produced a continuous labour force increase.  This produced a parellel increase of the 
revenues of Bismarckian insurances, as they rely heavily on the evolution of the labour market.  
The question is, how did Luxembourg manage to increase and improve its welfare offer during the 
last two to three decades, while other developed countries have had to cutback since the 1970s? We 
are looking for the reasons for this extraordinary evolution. 
 
Coming to the main question of the impact of the financial crisis, retrenchment policies, and more so 
those with a specific „answer‟ to the effects of the financial crisis have not been launched as of the end 
of 2009, but they have been discussed since autumn 2009. Discussion has also been more explicit 
since  spring  2010  as  a  result  of  the  clear  opposition,  between  unions  and  employers.  Whilst  a 
compromise orientated consensual debate took place in former decades. 
 
Within the following sections, we will provide a brief description of Luxembourg‟s welfare model, a 
short  introduction  to  the  particular  labour  market  with  an  exceptional  evolution  of  contributors, 
focussing  only  on  elements  which  have  a  direct  influence  on  the  crucial  sustainability  of  social 
security insurances. 
For the three insurances, we will present a brief outline of each scheme, some legal supranational 
(EU)  legal  conditions  which  have  an  impact  on  the  sustainability  of  the  national  schemes,  the 
evolution of the financial situation, and important reforms of the last five years. 
 
2.  Which type of welfare model 
We  will  briefly  classify  the  system  with  Esping-Andersen‟s  (1990)  three  welfare  models, 
demonstrating a unique combination of a strong corporatist model with Scandinavian elements. 
 
 (i)  Corporatist  principles:  Luxembourg  started  to  adopt  Bismarck‟s  insurance  models  in  1901. 
Contribution-rates  for  employers  and  employees  are  the  same  -  with  the  exception  of  the  care 
insurance, which is only financed by the employees and the State (launched in 1999). Insurances are 
co-financed, to a great extent, by the State; parameters for social aid are the household’s composition 
and its income – as opposed to the social-democratic criterion of the individual‟s situation. Providers 
of the main insurances (health and pension) were organised alongside professional categories, such as 5 
 
manual workers, manual workers of the steel industry, agriculture (bringing together employers and 
workers), employees, three categories of civil servants, etc. Within this model, the State place a large 
role in financing the welfare model (Cichon, 2007) and has a broad responsibility. One of drawbacks 
of the model  is the reliance of users on the State. Corporatist models are quite likely to sustain 
attitudes of “assist￩s” and hence OECD (1997) and later on EU (cf. different JER) highlighted the 
high rate of broad unemployment through people living on passive schemes – a phenomenon which 
concerns more nationals than foreigners (Hartmann-Hirsch and Amétépé, 2009). The impact of the 
Church is important, although it has decreased over the last decade (Hausman and Zahlen, 2010). The 
State and the Church are not seperate, and the female employment rates might be considered under 
this item: Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg presented the lowest female employment rate (Meulders et 
al., 1992) and are still below EU average (cf. JER and JRSPSI). Consequently, child care for Ireland 
and Luxembourg was the least developed within EU (Moss, 1988). A push for important child care 
provisions  which  aimed  at  increasingfemale  labour  market  participation  started  in  1997  with  the 
European Employment Strategy.This was stimulated by a supranational programme. Before 1997, 
social services were poorly developed: the main focus was on transfer provisions. Child care and the 
care for the elderly were considered to be the family‟s responsibility. Meanwhile, services for both 
target groups have been strongly developed
4) - a significant recalibration with a clear Scandinavian 
orientation. 
 
 (ii) Social-democratic Scandinavian standards and philosophy: Luxembourg adopted Scandinavian 
standards and went beyond these middle class levels. In corporatist as well as in liberal models, there 
is “equity amongst the poor” (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Scandinavian models and to an even greater 
degree Luxembourg developed middle class standards. The following examples might illustrate this: 
Child benefits in Luxembourg are by far the highest in EU given the previous focus on transfer 
provisions and the poorly developed service sector  (MISSOC and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009). As a 
response  to  the  financial  crisis,  transfer  provisions  were  restricted  with  a  re-commodification 
concerning cross border commuters (July 2010). Following these changes child benefits are paid up to 
the end of secondary school and study allowances have been introduced for resident students; they 
compensate the re-commodification. National schemes have been redefined (child benefits and study 
allowances) and launched (chèques-services for residents only) using the advantageous loopholes of 
national and supranational EU-legislation, excluding cross border commuters from certain parts of 
transfers they were entitled to previously.  
The policies for the elderly are extremely generous: Long Term Care Insurance (LTCI) provides with 
generous monthly cash benefits plus a broad scope of benefits in kind (home and institutional care; 
Hartmann-Hirsch, 2007).  Two other schemes balance out any danger of exclusion or of poverty in 
                                                           
4 cf. section 4.3.2. for the elderly and Bousselin, 2008 as well as the different National Action Plans within the 
European Employment and later on the Lisbon Strategy. 6 
 
old age
5, these provide sometimes elderly people with even higher standards in homes than those of 
their  previous housing conditions (MISSOC and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009). 
Pension insurance provides retired persons with extremely high gross pension replacement rates (3
rd / 
4
th position within OECD countries: OECD, 2009: 117).  
Out-of-pocket money by patients for delivered health services is the lowest within OECD countries 
(OECD, 2008: 123). 
 
For years, authorities have co-financed insurance schemes to an important extent, thus welfare is 
highly budgetised
6. Furthermore, some benefits are financed on the basis of the  state‟s budget alone 
(child and unemployment benefits); while in other corporatist countries they are financed on the basis 
of both: the employees and/or employers‟ contributions plus the state‟s budget.  
 
Table 1: Participation of the State to different welfare schemes (1995 – 2008; in %) 
Scheme  1995  2000  2005  2008 
Fonds national de solidarité  96.2  94.4  99.9   
Fonds  pour  l‟emploi  (employment 
agency) 
98.4  98.6  96.3  96.5  
Family benefits   90.8  94.0  94.4  94.6  
Pension scheme for civil servants   77.0  70.7  77.0  76.9  
Other benefits   88.1  86.0  70.8  65.6  
Health insurance   39.6  37.9  41.5  41.5  
Care insurance   -  46.0  46.1  40.3  
General Pension scheme   32.4  32.8  33.2  32.0  
Accident insurance   16.8  10.5  15.0  10.2  
Source: IGSS, 2000:  2005 and 2008. Graph 5.  
 
For more than a decade, the objective of authorities was to provide universal services and benefits, 
thus  avoiding  a  two  tier  welfare  model.  As  opposed  to  Germany,  there  is  no  trend  towards 
competition  amongst  providers  by  multiplying  them,  but  a  clear  trend  to  a  unique  national  –  
universalistic – public provider in order to increase membership and to reduce thus the risks, and, 
finally to protect citizens in the most egalitarian way. Hence, insurances were merged first in a less 
manifest  way  (health  insurance  reform  of  1992)  and  now  in  an  obvious  way.  Out  of  9  health 
                                                           
5 Act of   1998 concerning the “complément d’accueil gérontologique” providing those who cannot afford the 
full board price in homes for the elderly with the equivalent amount and the “tarification sociale” (without 
legal framework) which helps those who are not entitled to LTCI provisions and who cannot afford the high 
tarifs of the LTCI.  
6 “The tax share of the total financing of social security in Luxembourg is 40% higher than that of its direct 
neighbours that have simimilar (Bismarckian) systems of financing“ (Cichon, 2007: 38). 7 
 
insurances,  four  currently  co-existthe  “Caisse  nationale  de  sant￩”  (CNS),  bringing  together  six 
previous insurances of the non-public sector; the three providers for civil servants (national public 
service, municipalities‟ service and the “cheminots”, Luxembourg‟s national public train company), 
remain autonomous.  From the very beginning, one national care insurance (1999) has been launched, 
leaving behind the corporatist type of health and pension schemes. 
  
 (iii) Liberal principles: The relatively low indirect labour costs of Luxembourg (within EU-15 MS) 
might be seen as a liberal element as it gives incentives to companies‟ settling in Luxembourg.. Until 
now, Luxembourg could afford these low indirect labour cost (table 4) due to high tax revenues - the 
effect of an excellent performance of the competitive sector – without neglecting the development of a 
broad corporatist-conservative welfare offer with higher standards than the Scandinavian models. In 
Luxembourg,  the  State  compensates  the  low  contribution  of  both  partners  by  co-financing  these 
systems in a substantial way. The attitude concerning economic development and the effects might be 
liberal ones; the underlying philosophy for the welfare regime was and still is corporatist, protective 
and highly regulated. 
The recent care insurance (law of 19 June 1998) is financed by the employees/independent or self 
employed only plus by the state, whilst employers have not been asked to contribute. In the sense of a 
Beveridge tradition, the competitiveness of the economy should not be hindered by social policy 
obligations. Again, as opposed to liberal models, the state compensates with its own contribution the 
missing input of the employers‟. 
Thus in the beginning, insurances were launched and enlarged over decades alongside corporatist 
Bismarckian principles. Scandinavian objectives of high standards and egalitarian protection provided 
by universal schemes developed over the last two decades; liberal elements are marginal, or non-
existant.  
 
3.  Luxembourg’s domestic labour market and the evolution of  contributors to insurances 
and insured persons 
 (i) The highly regulated labour market (Haag, 2010) produces typical corporatist low female labour 
participation  and  early  exit  patterns  through  exit  paths  into  disability,  unemployment
7  and  early 
retirement. OECD (since the 199 0s) and CCE (cf. JER, since 1998/9)  notice since the 1990‟s the 
following  „weaknesses‟:  a  high  rate  of  inactivity  in  general  (since  OECD,  1997)  and,  more 
specifically,  too low labour market participations for women and elderly workers (JER, JRSPSI and 
OECD). Within EU-15 in 1998, two MS presented the lowest employment rates of the 55 – 64 old, 
                                                           
7 also via a new measure which was launched in order to reduce early labour market exit: “incapacité de 
travail”, 2002, cf. Hartmann-Hirsch, 2007. 8 
 
Belgium (22.9%) and Luxembourg (25.1); in 2007, Luxembourg is with 32 percent positioned as the 
third place MS at the bottom of the EU-27. Concerning a low female participation, Luxembourg was 
second at the bottom of the scale with 46.2 percent after Greece with 40.5% in 1998 and reached 9
th 
place in 2007 within EU 27 (JRSPSI, 2009: 183). For both items, immigrants perform far better than 
nationals and are close or reach the EU objectives of the Lisbon Strategy for 2010, while nationals lag 
behind
8. In other terms, inactivity and low labour market participation is mainly a phenomenon which 
concerns nationals (Hartmann-Hirsch and Amétépé, 2009). 
 
(ii) Luxembourg‟s labour market is highly dependent on foreigners
9.  Amongst OECD countries, it is 
the most diversified domestic (68.3 percent) and national (42.5 percent)  labour market and, to an 
even greater extent, the most diversified  competitive sector (74.4 percent)
10.  Cross border commuters 
represent 41.9 percent of the  domestic labour market and 47.3 percent  of the competitive and sem-














The impact of foreigners has developed considerably over the last 2 decades. The composition of the 




                                                           
8  For the 55 – 64 old, nationals have an employment rate of  27.3 percent versus 39.9 percent for migrants. For 
women, nationals present an employment rate of 52.5 versus 60.5 percent by migrants. Cf. Plan National de 
Réforme, 2008: 44: http://www.odc.public.lu/publications/pnr/Rapport_Plan_national_2008.pdf 
9 With this term we include both: migrants and cross border commuters. 
10 In 2008: http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/population/index.html 
Box 1 : national and domestic labour market 
The national labour market includes all those persons, who are residents in the Grand-Duchy independently 
of the country of employment, including thus the very small group of cross border commuters who are 
residents in Luxembourg and work in the neighbouring regions : 700 persons (juillet 2009). 
The internal labour market includes  all those  persons who work in Luxembourg independently of their 
country of residence, including the numerous cross border commuters who are residents in the 
neighbouring MS and work in Luxembourg: 147.657 persons (juillet 2009). 
To distinguish both is extremely important for Luxembourg, because of different EU legal disposals 
concerning the residence and work countries, which affect membership, thus contributions  as well  as 
expenditure for residents and non-residents. 9 
 










When compared with other EU states, Luxembourg was mostly on top of the EU scale with regard to 
GDP and employment increase (cf. JER and JRSPSI). There was an average annual employment 
increase  of 3.7 percent between 1998 and 2008;  for cross border commuters, the annual average was 
8.8 percent, for resident migrants  3.7 percent and for nationals 0.3 percent
11.   
 
Table 2: evolution of employed and employers: domestic labour market (table 17) 
  1988  1997  2007  2008  2009 
Resident nationals  90.999  86.748  95.083  96.333  97.670 
Resident migrants  38.530  57.702  83.854  88.727  90.994 
Inflowing  cross 
border commuters 
24.567  62.370  132.744  143.716  147.400 
Total  154.096  206.820  311.681  328.776  336.064 
Source: IGSS, 2009: 45 






On top of this, Luxembourg‟s immigration  performs well. The top and the bottom of the socio-
professional scale are mainly occupied by foreigners, while nationals are in a sandwiched position 
with on average, slightly lower educational levels than foreigners and an overall lower employment 
rate (Hartman-Hirsch, 2008). 
 
 (iii) Given the, on average, younger immigrants (Thill-Ditsch, 2010) and cross border commuters (Di 
Bartolomeo,  2009),  Luxembourg  has  never  experienced  ageing  effects  which  put  other  welfare 
regimes  under  pressure.    The  continuous  increase  of,  on  average,  young  active  foreigners  has  a 
positive effect on  the revenues of the three insurances as well as on the modest take-up (Hartmann-
Hirsch  and  Amétépé,  2009);  as  a  result  of  these  two  inflows  (immigrants  and  cross  border 
commuters). Luxembourg was able to maintain the age structure of  1998 with exception of a slight 
ageing trend for those aged 40 – 59: 
 
Table 3: composition of the resident insured population with regard to age in % 
  1998  2000  2005  2007  2008 
  0 – 19  24.5  24.8  24.5  24.2  24.0 
20 - 39   31.1  30.6  28.7  28.1  28.0 
40 – 59  25.5  25.9  28.2  28.8  29.0 
60 – 79  15.9  15.7  15.4  15.3  15.3 
= < 80  3.0  3.0  3.3  3.5  3.6 
  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Di Bartolomeo, 2009: 171 
 
 
 (iv) However, for the first time at the end of 2008, the job increase for cross border commuters was 
below that of residents and negative from 2009 onwards. From January to December 2009, cross 
border  commuters  dropped  from  147.630  to  145.249,  a  decrease  of  1.6  percent
12  (cf.  graph 71, 
STATEC, 2010: 65) as opposed to the annual average increase of 8.8 percent over the last 10 years.   
 Seventy six percent of Interim workers, quite a small group, are cross border commuters. They are 
the most fragile group of employees. They increased steadily over the last years, but strong ly 
decreased in 2008 and to an even greater extent in 2009 with a loss of 25 percent, dropping from 7922 
(2008) to 5938 (2009) contracts.  
                                                           




Hence employers obviously „dismissed‟ first  all the interim workers  and maintained those with full 
contracts. In a second stage,  crossborder commuters with full contracts were dismissed. Given EU 
regulation (1408/71
13, art. 71), in the case of unemployment cross border commuters, whether interim 
workers or not, register in the case of unemployment in their country of residence and unemployment 
benefits are paid by the neighbouring authorities. Thus, they do not appear within Luxembourg‟s 
statistics and do not weigh on the budget of the national “Fonds pour l‟emploi”.  
 (v)  Given  the  excellent  evolution  of  employment  and  hence  of  contributors  and  given  the 
Bismarckian principle of dependency on welfare from the labour force, as well as the high financial 
participation  of  the  State  to  insurances  and  other  schemes,  the  sustainability  of  social  security 
provisions‟  (in  cash  and  in  kind)  was  guarenteed.  This  occurred  even  in  view  of  the  steadily 
increasing standards and the introduction of comprehensive new systems and benefits such as those 
for childcare and the elderly. 
 
4.  Les régimes de maladie, de pension et de dépendance 
 (i) Out of the different elements which have an impact on the sustainability of welfare systems and 
retrenchment policies, migration is sometimes considered a factor which increases the likelihood of 
cutbacks.    It  is  expected  that  migrants  will  consume  more  than  they  contribute
14. Migration is, 
alternatively, considered to be a positive element against ageing societies, at least in the intermediate 
term
15. The evolution of Luxembourg‟s welfare system (in terms of quality and quantity) is a perfect 
example of the positive input of a steadily increasing foreign labour force, combating ageing as well 
as providing insurances with permanently increasing revenues. 
 
 (ii) In terms of an overall introduction, we will briefly highlight the privileged contribution rates for 
employers and employees given the substantial input by the State. As contribution rates are defined in 
a  different  way  –either  by  each  individual  scheme  or  as  an  overall  rate  –  we  will  introduce  the 
following comparative table on Luxembourg and the neighbouring corporatist countries before going 
into the specific situation of the three insurance schemes: 
 
   
                                                           
13 We consider only this regulation and leave out the future 883/2004 entering into force in May 2010 as the 
period od coverage for this report concerns mainly 2005 to 2009. In any case, we have no statistical data on 
2010. 
14 Borjas  (Borjas and Hilton, 1996 ) would be one of the best known researchers for this argumentation. 
15 Razin-Sadka demonstrate even a long term positive impact on sustainability of the pension schemes, but 
most researchers present the current positive impact, given the generally well known effects of an also ageing 
migration population and the quickly adapting fertility patterns. 12 
 
Table 4: contribution rates by employers (E – ers) and employees (E- ees)(Missoc , 2009) 
  Overall  Health insurance  Pension insurance  Care insurance 
  E - ers  E - ees  E - ers  E - ees  E - ers  E - ees  E - ers  E - ees 




8.0  8.0    1.4 
FR  28.45  7.7  12.8  0.75  8.3  6.65  0.3  -- 
BE  24.7  13.07  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
DE  17.925  18.825  7.0  7.9  9.95  9.95  0.975  0.975 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do 
 
This  table  should  be  more  detailed  including  also  ceiling  conditions,  stating  more  precisely  the 
inclusion of certain types of risk in the one or the other insurance
16 and more specific conditions, e.g.  
for civil servants in Belgium (cf. MISSOC). French and Belgium employers have higher contribution 
rates than their counterparts, the employees. Looking at the overall rate, Luxembourg provides the 
most favourable rate for both, employers and employees. Other benefits like unemployment are 
entirely financed by the State‟s budget. This explains the high net wages with low indirect labour cost, 
mainly because no other payments for social security are deducted.  
 
Initially, welfare systems were developed within Nation-states, aiming at nationals. After World War 
II,  national  welfare  regimes  became  more  and  more  obliged  by  supranational  (European  and 
international)  conventions  to  integrate  all  residents,  to  avoid  exclusion  of  certain  groups,  e.g. 
migrants, thus providing all residents with equal opportunities (Bommes, 2007, Ette and Faist, 2007). 
Hence,  “national  citizenship  is  losing  ground  to  a  more  universal  model  of  membership, 
deterritoralized  personal  rights”  (Soysal,  1994:  3).  Luxembourg  is  much  more  “subject”  to these 
supranational legal conditions than any other MS due to its highly transnationalised labour force. 
Effects of foreigners on the sustainability of welfare are, as we will demonstrate, are mainly positive 
given their high employment rates. Further the favourable old age dependency ratio and, in the case of 
cross border commuters, a favourable family-member dependency ratio also heightens immigrations 
overall contribution. „Negative‟ effects can be mentioned, e.g. in the case of the arrival of foreigners 
or nationals at the end of their professional career, without a substantial previous contribution record. 
Obviously, up to now, the positive effects predominated. 
For  the  three  insurances,  we  will  provide  some  illustration  of  the  impact  of  supranational  legal 
frameworks on national welfare schemes and their – in this case – extremely positive evolution.  
 
                                                           
16 disability is either within the pension scheme, the case of Luxembourg, or within health insurance, the case 
of France. 13 
 
Due to a higher dependency on welfare benefits with economic downturns since the Seventies, many 
MS modified their original systems, mostly in the sense of a liberalisation, which meant „cutback‟ in 
comparison to the former more generous provisions with a shift of responsibility from the State and 
companies to the individual citizen. Ferrera (2005) demonstrated that there was a slight retrenchment 
for Scandinavian welfare models, a slowdown or a stabilisation for the corporatist and liberal ones, 
and  an  expansion  for  the  Mediterranean  systems,  those  with  the  previously  „poorest‟  provisions. 
Corporatist and Scandinavian regimes proceeded with cost containment and recalibration measures 
whilst liberal systems used cost-containment and re-commodification. Corporatist recalibration had to 
begin a serious up-dating process, whilst the Scandinavian models had to rationalize, which is to say 
no real dismantling took place. (Pierson, 2001) Adelanto and Calderon (2006) observe “convergence 
to a middle position” and no case of expansion within the three “traditional” regimes by Esping-
Andersen (1990)
17. With regard to several authors (Pierson, 200 1; Sapir 2006), corporatist regimes 
offer equity, but lack efficiency given the early e xit patterns and massive use of  passive schemes, 
which endangers the sustainability of those schemes and social security provisions in general. 
Luxembourg offers equity with middle class standards, but produces high broad unemployment  with  
too great a take-up of passive schemes (cf. OECD, JER, JRSPI). As we will see, foreigners make up 
for the loss of active nationals; though obviously, attitudes differ. Pierson (2001) proposes for those 
traditional schemes to enlarge massively the service sector, which me ans „up-dating‟ to contextual 
conditions for the current need of labour participation. He also acknowledges the difficulties these 
systems  have  given  the  long  standing  cost  containment  orientation  for  welfare  spendings.  
Luxembourg however was able to develop the social service sector in response to the aformentioned 
societal change – given the unique situation of a permanently ajuvenating mainly foreign labour force. 
Over the last few years, Luxembourg has increasing adopted a service orientaded reform agenda, 
mainly for the child care and old age sectorsthrough the reduction in a moderate way of transfer 
provisions (in summer 2010). The services were previously financed, to a larger extent, by users than 
is the case now (spring 2009) – thus a serious „up-dating‟ of the welfare system happened (Pierson, 
2001). The economic „virtuous spiral‟ with its steadily increasing labour force allowed authorities to 
go for a Scandinavian orientation. 
 
Thus, expansion and not retrenchment took place. We will present an exceptional case of important 
reserves (pension scheme), at a first glance a “quite comfortable” balance with the massive launching 
of services plus transfer (care insurance)
18, as well as a long standing danger of  imbalance (health 
insurance), even with steadily increasing revenues. Until now there has been no serious cutback which 
                                                           
17 Some enlargements took place in the mediterrenean countries; however, these systems lag still behind 
those of the Northern MS. 
18 which however has been granted only by a considerable increase of the contribution rate after 4 years of 
existence of the scheme. 14 
 
has affected patients, cared persons or pensioners and also employers enjoy the lowest contributions 
rates within this part of Europe (table 4). 
 
In conclusion, we can say that the expansion and improvement of the welfare regime would not have 
been possible without the migrants‟ and cross border commuters‟  input (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009).  
 
4.1. L’assurance maladie-maternité 
Luxembourg‟s health insurance is in a favourable situation as compared to other MS with an annual 
average increase of contributors of  3.7 percent over the last 10 years. 
The main part of revenues are those of contributions by employers and employees, both with a current 
(cf. box 2) rate of 5.9 percent of wages up to a ceiling of 5 times the minimum wage (i.e. € 8.206,- 
2009 up to June 2010). The contribution rates are low compared to neighbouring countries (table 4). 
 
The State participates to an extent of 40 percent (last five years) to the health insurance budget. Its 
contribution is defined as a share of employers‟ and employees‟ contributions. Hence, for both parts 
of the revenues – contributions and State‟s co-financing –, the receipts depend nearly entirely on the 
evolution of the labour market.They are thus extremely volatile within a small open economy relying 
to an extent of three quarters on foreigners (competitive sector). On top of this, 80% of technical 
equipment and infrastructure is financed by the State. The remaining 20 percent plus running costs are 
financed by the health insurance, the “Caisse Nationale de Sant￩” (CNS).  Health provisions are hence 
highly budgetised (Cichon, 2007). 
The State‟s contribution is also defined with regard to the employees‟ and employers‟ contributions.  
 
Out-of-pocket money is the lowest on an OECD scale (OECD, 2008: 123) with approximately 5 
percent.  
No two tir policy has taken place: tarifs are the same for all insured; doctors have to register and sign 
a convention, being thus bound with regard to their tarification. The only parallel system which exists 
is the one of international officials, having their own „transnational‟ social security; a convention 
exists between these transnational health insurances and the CNS. Up to now, one unique “mutuelle” 
exists covering some residual elements. Private insurances (like DKV) have – it seems - a modest 
presence; however no figures are available .   
Luxembourg‟s health provisions are amongst the most expensive in OECD countries (OECD, 2008: 
107s). For total expenditure per capita, Luxembourg is the second most expensive on the ranking 
followed directly by the US. Considering the insured non-resident population, it still remains on the 
same level as Norway and Switzerland (OECD, 2008: 107s). In contrast, outcomes, namely the health 15 
 
status of the population  (OECD, 2008: 97) and the satisfaction of the insured (OECD, 2008: 105), are 
“only averages by international comparison” or in a middle range (OECD, 2008: 99ss). 
Transfer to hospital treatment abroad is largely used; Luxembourg is on top of the EU scale, due to 
the fact that it has no university hospital and authorities consider the right of access to high level 
provisions. Furthermore, services provided abroad weigh less in terms of expenditure and are thus 
efficient for the balance of CNS. 
The  success  story  of  Luxembourg  relies  on  the  outstanding  evolution  of  highly  performing 
contributors with a low dependency ratio for the inflowing foreigners (cross border commuters and 
immigrants) and modest consumptions given their age structure (table 3): 
 
Table 5: insured population with contributors and their co-insured family members 
Source: di Batolomeo, 2009: 174 (data: CNS) 
There was an increase of resident insured persons from 1998 to 2008 of 14.9 percent, whilst the 
increase for resident and non-resident insured was 33.9 percent. 
 
68.3 percent of the protected persons (contributors and co-insured family members) contributed in 
2008 as compared to 64.9 percent in 1998
19. 
 
                                                           
19 Rapport general de l’IGSS, 2008: 28. 
  1998  2000  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Residents 
Active Contributors  176.355  186.681  206.083  209.544  213.436  219.298 
Their family members  131.612  135.515  140.083  140.508  141.133  141.632 
Contributing pensionners  72.125  72.511  75.602  76.816  78.108  79.216 
Their family members  23.906  23.742  23.014  23.104  23.075  23.034 
Sub-total  403.998  418.182  444.782  449.972  455.752  463.180 
Non-residents (cross border commuters) 
Active contributors  72.310  89.744  122.619  130.667  140.945  151.232 
Their family members  19.200  22.860  35.089  37.699  40.899  45.154 
Contributing  pensionners  3.526  3.700  4.391  4.725  5.147  5.594 
Their family members  913  939  1.036  1.103  1.138  1.156 
Sub-total  95.949  117.243  163.135  174.194  188.129  203136 
Residents and non residents 
Total  499.947  535.425  607.917  624.166  643.881  666.316 16 
 
The dependency ratio of cross border commuters (e.g. in 2008) is significantly lower than that of 
residents for both categories with 60.7 versus 77.0 percent for the active and with 77.5 versus 82.8  
percent for the pensioners (cf. also Langers and Schuller, 2006). The EU legislation (next section) 
explains  this.  With  regard  to  pensioners,  one  could  highlight  the  stronger  female  labour  force 
participation in France (the majority of cross border commuters are from France), hence women are 
not co-insured but insured as contributors
20.  
 
For the first time in decades there was a decrease in new cross border commuters of 1.6%.  
 
4.1.1.  Supranational and national legal framework 
Given  the  highly  transnational  composition  of  the  contributors/members  of  health  insurance,  the 
supranational legislation has an extremely high impact on the sustainability of the insurance. 
 
Currently,  migrants  and  more  so  cross  border  commuters  weigh  less  on  health  insurance  for 
demographic  reasons  (being  younger,  thus  using  less  health  services)  and  due  to  EU  legislation 
(regulation 1408/71 and 1612/68; Langers and Schuller, 2006).   
 
Migrants: In the particular situation  of Luxembourg, the strong participation of high performing 
foreigners in the labour force produces high revenues for the insurances and modest expenditure. 
Once migrants - or cross border commuters - return (e.g. for retirement) and they had a mixed career 
in Luxembourg and another or other MS the burden is on the insurances of the  other MS. This 
stipulation has a particularly important impact on the expenditures of insurances for the last and most 
expensive years of life.   
For those with a full career in Luxembourg, who become residents of another MS during the years of 
retirement, the country of employment will have the burden of health provisions. Again a European 
disposal provides the high cost countries with a favourable sustaining outcome. The health insurance 
of the competent country  (= Luxembourg)  pays a flat rate (calculated  as the average of annual 
consumption of these age groups) towards the health insurance for the MS of residence (abroad). The 
flat rate of a low wage country like Portugal is less expensive than flat rates of high wage countries 
like Luxembourg or Denmark and is certainly also less expensive than real costs enhanced by patients 
of this age group if they would remain in Luxembourg. In the case of Luxembourg, the sustainability 
of its health insurance is improved with each returning migrant and with each leaving retired national, 
even with the payment of the aformentioned flat rate (OECD, 2008: 128). 
 
                                                           
20 Cross border commuters are to a large extent male contributing employees (Rapport général sur la sécurité 
sociale, 2008: 147). Women often continue to work in the region of residence after the birth of the 1st child. 17 
 
Cross  border  commuters  do  mostly  use  health  services  in  their  country  of  residence,  where 
provisions are less expensive given the wage difference between Luxembourg and the neighbouring 
countries
21.  Children  (family  members)  are  co -insured  in  Luxembourg  with  the  cross  border 
commuter only, when both partners work in Luxembourg or when the only active partner of the 
couple is the cross border commuter. If one of the two parents works in the country of residence, 
children are co-insured with this parent. In many cases, once women give birth to children, they 
continue or restart working in the country of residence and children are then insured with them abroad 
– this explains the low family member dependency ratio of cross border commuters (table 5) and their 
sustaining contributions to social security with modest consumptions (OECD, 2008: 106, figure 4.5).  
 
The EU immigrant, who arrives at the end of his career in Luxembourg (logically with a mixed 
career), and decides to stay in Luxembourg is fully entitled and will be a „burden‟ to health and care 
insurance, mainly during the last years of his life.  
 
As opposed to the aformentioned literature on migrants‟ higher take-up (cf. note 10), in Luxembourg, 
migrants and cross border commuters contribute much more than they consume (Hartmann-Hirsch 
and Amétépé, 2009).  
4.1.2.  Financial balance 
The financial situation of health insurance has been fragile for several years, although there was a 
steady increase of contributors with a favourable family member dependency ratio of cross border 
commuters as well as a modest consumption by foreigners due to their relative youth. Provisions are 
amongst the most expensive on an OECD scale; contribution rates are low and out-of-pocket money is 
the  lowest  amongst  OECD  countries.  The  favourable  relation  between  cross  border  commuters‟ 
contributions to social security and to taxes as compared to spending for them has been highlighted by 
OECD (2008:  106).  
 
According to art. 80 of the law of 27 July 1992, an annual meeting of the quadripartite
22 (bringing 
together employers‟, employees‟ organisations, the government and health providers) has to examen 
the financial situation. In October 2009, quadripartite tackled the balance of CNS. The background 
papers  by  authorities  (Ministère  de  la  Sécurités  Sociale  (MSS),  Sept.  2009  and  October  2009) 
                                                           
21 Ministère de la Sécurité sociale, octobre 2009: 2: “il faut constater une forte dépendance ￠ long terme d’une 
croissance élevée du PIB et du taux d’emploi, dépendant notamment des salariés frontaliers, qui ne recourent 
pas, au même titre que les résidents aux prestations de l’assurance maladie-maternité luxembourgeoise, et 
ceci pour des raisons de structure d’âge et d’une préférence pour leurs propres systèmes de prise en charge, 
moins onéreux.” (underlined by CHH). The win-win situation of Luxembourg is more due to the permanent 
employment increase than to the employment rate. 
22 Luxembourg’s famous social model relies more on corporatist concertation than on the Westminster model 
with a Parliamentary decision making process (cf. Hirsch, 2003). 18 
 
provided a clear analysis of the situation.  The viability of health insurance depends largely (cf. p. 9) 
on the evolution of employment. Employment and mainly that of cross border commuters decreased 
considerably after the financial crisis. Thus, first revenues decreased due to the missing cross border 
commuters‟  contributions
23. Secund,  expenditure  will  rise  due  to  higher  consumption  by  the,  on 
average, older residents, mainly older nationals and third, expenses will increase due to a higher 
family-member  dependency  ratio.  Thus,  the  declining  share  of  the  very  „efficient‟  cross  border 
commuters will have a significant negative triple impact on the viability of CNS‟ finances.  
Independently of the crisis and the reduction in employment, authorities have shown for certain areas 
an increase of expenditure, which is higher than the increase of contributors. This is the case of 
provisions (doctors‟ visits), which increased between 2007 and 2008 by 2.3 percent as compared to an 
increase of 1.5 percent of insured persons (MSS, sept. 2009: 18).     
The financial situation should remain in balance and has to rely on a reserve, which is defined by law: 
“r￩serve qui ne peut être inf￩rieure à dix pour cent, ni sup￩rieure à vingt pour cent du montant annuel 
des dépenses. “(art. 28 of Code de la Sécurité Sociale). The financial balance of UCM / CNS has been 
a topos in and during quadripartite negotiations for years. In 2004, 130 million. € were transferred 
from the reserve of pension schemes (cf. section 4.2.2.)as part of the contribution revenues in order to 
tackle an important deficit. The deficit has been caused by unusual construction activities for hospitals 
in this year.  
 
 Table 6 : revenues, expenditure and reserve (in million €) 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
  Décompte  Revised estimations 
Current revenues  1.569,4  1.608,6  1 .709,6  1.836,6  1977,5  1927,9  1971,6 
Annual variation  14.9  2.5%  6.3%  7.4%  7.7%  -2.5%  2.3% 
               
Current expenditure  1510,1  1662,2  1.707,7  1.827,5  1.944,7  1.965,3  2.039.9 
Annual variation      2.7%  7.0%  6.4%  1.1%  3.8% 
Positive/négative saldo  59,3  -53,6  1.9  9.0  32.8  -37.4  -68.3 





Cf. also Ministère de la Sécurité sociale, Sept. 2009: 9. *includes € 130 mill. input from the reserve of 
the pension insurance.  
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n 2009 and 2010, the situation became imbalanced  again and there was  an estimated deficit of  68.3 
mill € for 2010. The decrease in employment  had an obvious impact on the revenues of the CNS; this 
may well have serious consequences, given the still unknown level and duration of the  „withdrawal‟ 
of  cross  border  commuters  with  immediate  effects  on  decreasing  revenues  and  increasing 
expenditure
24.  Quadripartite decided in October 2009 to use the legally required reserve, by allowing 
a reserve of only 5.5 percent instead of the legally foreseen minimum of 10 percent (art. 28 CSS).  In 
the case of problems with liquidity, the CNS will rely on the reserve of the Long Term Care Insurance 
(LTCI;  IGSS, 2009: 141).  The lowering of t he reserve  conditions enhances immediate  „positive‟ 
effects: whilst with a reserve of a minimum of 10%, there will be the above indicated deficit. There is 
even a cumulated positive saldo with the lowered minimum reserve of 5.5 percent (in brackets), which 
does however not change the real financial balance of the CNS.  
 
4.1.3.  Reforms - in the light of the crisis? 
 (i) A major reform took place at the beginning of 2009, the introduction of “statut unique” (law of 13 
May    1998)
25, which  tackled the  final
26  merging of  all  non  civil  servant  insurances. The  global 
objective of the reform is a typical universalistic one
27.  The specific objective was to merge 6 of the 9 
health insurances which were organised according  to corporatist socio-professional status (workers, 
workers of steel industry, etc.)
28 into one unique “Caisse Nationale de Santé”. This was meant to 
guarentee a) equal net wages (cf. box 2),  b) less administrative work for the CNS and for companies, 
c) lower indirect labour cost at long term for companies, and d) economies for CNS on expenditure 





                                                           
24 cf. above the triple effect of the decreasing number of cross border commuters with a still sustaining effect 
on CNS’ financial balance. The necessarily ageing cross border commuters will rely much more - than this is 
currently the case - on CNS, once they will have had a full career in Luxembourg, but still they will weigh less 
on CNS’ budget due to supranational legal disposals such as the flat rate (cf. above p. 12ss, OECD, 2008 and 
CNS, 2010: 25). 
25 This can be considered as a result of the opinion of “tripartite committee” conclusions of 26 April 2006; the 
preparation of the draft bill took more or less two years. 
26 The reform in 1992 was a major step in the sense of universalisation, when Union des caisses de maladie 
(UCM) took over the overall responsability of financial and organisational management leaving to the former 9 
insurances the only reimbursement of provisions in kind.  
27 “L’assurance maladie a comme souci majeur la gestion optimale des ressources afin de garantir un accès 
équitable  aux soins, maintenir un niveau de protection élevé tout en préservant la viabilité financière du 
système” (IGSS, 2008: 59). 
28 The three insurances aimed at civil servants remained remained autonomous. 
29 A higher consumption of the sickness leave benefit had been observed for manual workers as compared to 
















This reform was launched in 2006 by quadripartite and cannot be considered as a measure responding 
to the effects of the financial crisis. 
 
(ii) The Rapport de stratégie national 2008 – 2010 (2008: 83 – 89) proposes different strategies. 
Some of them aim at an improvement of the system: the quality control for hospitals (EFQM), a study 
concerning patient satisfation, procedures in favour of an „evidence based medecine‟, improvement of 
the preventive medecine and awareness rasising campaigns, etc. Others aim at reducing expenditure:  
a  more  economic  medication, a  more  modest  take-up  of  passive early  exit  (from  labour  market) 
measures such as “incapacit￩ de travail” etc., a reduction of variable expenditure of hospitals. The 
report does not respond to nor is it based upon the economic downturn.  
 (iii)  Other  remidies  have  been  launched  during  recent  months  with  regard  to  the  effects  of  the 
financial crisis (Ministère de la sécurité sociale, 2009a). Generally speaking, the objective to provide 
health services which are based on national solidarity with equal access for the insured – universal 
coverage - and with a high quality is not questioned at all. Authorities do not intend to increase 
contributions or out of pocket money and they do not intend to question the binding contracts for 
Box 2: Cost containment concerning cash benefit of manual workers 
The crucial point before the reform were different contribution rates companies had to face for 
employees and manual workers. Before 2009, contributions for sickness leave were fixed at 4.7 
percent for manual workers and 0.2 percent for employees / self employed. For years, the workers’ 
‘absentéisme’ has been observed (Tchicaya, 2006). In the case of workers regimes, health insurance 
took over the cash benefit in the case of a sickness leave from the 1st day onwards, whilst the 
employers of employees carried on paying wages during the first 13 weeks of a sickness leave; from 
14th week onwards, health insurance took over. This produced lower net wages for workers, lower 
indirect labour cost for employers with regard to employees. Authorities observed a certain abuse 
supposedly caused by the insured (who were not always in need of serious medical aid), by doctors 
(prescribing quickly) and/or by employers (suggesting sickness leave to their workers in order to 
compensate conjunctoral problems).  Now, a general contribution rate of 0.5 percent has been fixed 
and employers can register with a private insurance, a “mutuelle”, which covers 80% of the cash 
benefit for workers during the first 13 weeks.  As companies have to take over the remaining 20 
percent, sickness leave might decrease. 21 
 
doctors.  No  liberalisation  will  take  place.  Quality  should  remain  the  same  and  should  even  be 
improved (via quality control mecanism).  National universalistic services – thus no multiplication of 
providers - should provide high quality for everybody (Klenk, 2010). 
 
But the viability of the system should also be guarenteed. Problems with the financing of health 
provisions have existed for years and most of the proposals have already been presented previously – 
independently of the financial crisis. 
The cash benefit (box 2 above) should have a positive effect  on the balance - data for evaluation are 
however not yet available.  
 (iv) The employers (Bley, 2008, also Fontagné, 2004 and 2009) highlighted the negative effects of 
an increase of the employers‟ contribution rate on the competitiveness of the economy: given the 
already  very  high  gross  wages,  exportation  is  significantly  challenged  and  endangered  by  the 
neighbouring MS. Only a high performing economy can sustain a substantial and generous social 
security system  like Luxembourg‟s – as Scandinavia demonstrates. If however there is to much 
weight on the employers, the competitiveness of the economy will be reduced within an international 
framewrok.   
 
 (v) The unions highlighted the good performance of the economy, which finally were less dramatic 
than expectations had suggested. For years, unions have defended their position with a discourse 
pleading against any measure which would enhance an eventual “Sozialabbau” (dismantling). One of 
the categorically refused proposals was the increase of contribution rates for the employees. 
 
 (vi) The quadripartite proposals in October 2009 (March 2010) focus on containment of expenditure 
with numerous measures – many of them had already been proposed  during recent years.   
  As a „one shot‟ measure, the reserve of CNS (art. 30 of the Code (CSS)), will be lowered to 
5.5 percent (cf. above). 
  Containment of other expenses will be guarenteed via a  payment freeze of tarification of 
laboratories,  of    budgets  for  hospitals,  the  down  grading  construction  activities  for 
infrastructure,etc.  
  Evaluation of providers (hospitals‟activities, doctors) and users should be done in order to 
contain expenses. 
  Further  synergies  mainly  in  the  hospital  sector  should  be  developped  aiming  at  cost 
containment but also at improving quality (via concentration of skills and equipment). 22 
 
  Collective bargaining for medicaments should be pushed as well as the privileged prescription 
of generic drugs.  
Two acts should  be reformed  in  the following  months: the  act  of  27 July  1992  (the  last reform 
implementing the universal coverage of the 9 insurances) and the act of 1998 concerning hospitals – 
the reform had already been mentioned within the current government‟s programme of 2009
30 and 
before and is not directly influenced by the financial crisis. Up to now, precise outlines of these 
coming draft bills are not yet available. 
 
 (iv) OECD (2008: 97ss) highlights the outstanding expenditure, the very expensive health services, 
the  lowest  out  of  pocket  money  as  compared  to  a  quite  average  outcome  with  an  average  life 
expectancy and mortality rates.  
a)  There should be more cost-efficiency analysis being done. OECD also highlights the increase 
of  contributors  and  the  even  higher  increase  of  expenditure  despite  the  aforementioned 
rejuvenating  inflow of cross border commuters.  
b)  The remaining 3 insurances of civil servants
31 should also be merged into CNS in order to 
gain maximum economies of scale.  
c)  As Luxembourg has no university hospital, it is the country with the highest share of transfers 
to other EU-MS. A broader opening-up of health services in the Greater Region would be 
helpful in terms of  
o  economies given the, on average, less expensive provisions for Luxembourg,  
o  a hospital planification on the basis of the Greater Region, which would be more 
efficient, enhancing economies of scale and improvements of quality of the supply. 
Astonishingly enough, point b) has not really been debated in the press. Civil servants benefit of an 
unquestioned specific legal framework including health (and pension) insurance. 
The last recommandation c) is a politically delicate one, in so far as health systems – like welfare in 
general - consider themselves still to be related to Nation-States and that they award protection as 
non-  competitive  health  sector  (cf.  the  intense  debate  on  the  Bolkestein  directive). 
Transnationalisation  is  imposed  by  supranational  institutions,  mainly  by  CJEU  (decision 
Kohll/Decker,e.g.) and national systems defend themselves against opening–up. The hospital sector is 
                                                           
30 Elections took place in June 2009. 
31 In numerous legal texts, civil servants award specific frameworks. Astonshingly enough, there was nearly no 
debate concerning the fact that the three civil servants’ insurances did not participate in the merge. 23 
 
a current object of „European‟ debate, whilst opening-up for the ambulatory sector is fully accepted in 
Luxembourg. However, the reimboursement of services abroad leads again and again to discussion 
between patients and CNS (cf. reports by the Ombudsman). Luxembourg‟s authorities proposed a 
greater degree of opening-up (Ministère de la Sécurité Sociale, 2009a). Transnational opening-up 
would – no doubt – introduce competitiveness into the universalistic national regimes and a higher 
sustainability of the budget.   
Quadripartite  proposals  are  ambivalent  with  regard  to  opening-up.  On  the  one  hand,  the  use  of 
services abroad is mentioned; on the other side, a freeze of contracting (“conventionnement”) on 
incoming  foreign  doctors  is  mentioned,  protecting  those,  who  benefit  from  the  current  generous 
system. Cross border commuters‟ input demonstrates the increasing and vital impact of supranational 
disposals on national legal frameworks and the positive financial impact of “transnationals”
32  on the 
sustainability of the national welfare schemes. 
In conclusion,  the negative effects of the financial crisis did not produce a wide spread debate. Up to 
2009, policies rarely worsened the comfortable situation of the contributors (low contribution rates for 
employers and employees) and the patients (unchanged out-of pocket money).  Improving quality is 
still on the agenda. The measures proposed are quite similar to those in former years; if we  consider 
them on a “continuum from the status quo to a full-fledged neoliberal agenda of radical retrenchment“ 
(Pierson, 2001: 419), the proposed measures remain quite close to the staus quo.  A radical change is 
not  yet  on  the  agenda.  However,  during  the  quadripartite  debate  in  March  2010,  the  minister 
announced a future higher impact by the State.  The State is the most important contributor amongst 
the three partners (State, employers and employees) and he announced the new draft bill restructuring 
health insurance in order to make the system sustainable. 
Within  coproratist  insurances,  Luxembourg‟s  offer  is  certainly  still  the  most  efficient  for  users. 
Contributors (employers and employees)  contribute little, patients enjoy the lowest out of pocket 
money  and  providers  benefited  from  guranteed  tarifications  with  high  standards  with  however  a 
meddle position in terms of quality of services (OECD, 2008: 100ss). 
With regard to policiy changes – we cannot really use the term retrenchment - , the cash benefit for 
manual workers (box 2) can be considered as a cost containment measure and as a recalibration, 
implemented independently of the financial crisis. 
 
                                                           
32 We use of this term here in order to underline contrasts. Within the migration literature, this term is 
applicable just to a certain share of migrants.  24 
 
4.2. Pension scheme 
Luxembourg‟s pension scheme covers three groups of users: the insured elderly, surviving partners or 
children (orphans) and the disabled
33.  
 
According to OECD, Luxembourg offers for old age one of the four highest replacement rates within 
OECD countries (OECD, 2007). 
 
According  to  Bismarc kian  principles,  revenues  are  composed  out  of  equal  contributions  by 
employers, employees and the State with 8 percent of the gross wages  for each of the three  (93.1 
percent of the total revenues in 2008).  Some other revenues like (income of wealth, other revenues: 
6.9 percent in 2008), are of minor importance. Again, contribution rates are the lowest within Greater 
Region (table 4). Effects of an economic immigration within a  Bismarckian model produced the 
extraordinary evolution  of  Luxembourg‟s  pension  system  due  to  a  steady  and  strong  increase  of 
employment combined with a permanently rejuvenating group of contributors (table 3 and 5): the 
active foreigners of the private sector. The same principle also produces a favourable dependency 
ratio on the evolution of the economy and consequently of the labour force and enhances in times of 
economic down-turn an immediate automatic decrease in revenues.   
 
For the following section, we will mostly limit our description to the general scheme (private sector) 
leaving out civil servants as they are awarded a different legal framework and are directly financed by 
the State. Out of 348.700 active resident and non-resident contributors in 2008, 8.9 percent were civil 
servants.  In 2008, out of the total of 144.608 pensioners (old age, survivors and disability) 8.6 percent 
receive their pension directly by the State. Given higher wages for the public sector also replacement 
rates are higher.   
Looking  at  average    payments  by  the  CNAP  is  not  very  conclusive  as  they  contain  numerous 
payments  for  some  years  of  activity  in  Luxembourg  for  former  migrants.  Considering  the  male 
residents only, the average monthly payment was € 2.884,59 in 2008.  
 
Over the last two decades, important adjustments to inflation and adapting to a level of real wages 
took place: Between 1985 and 2008, the first one produced an increase of 62.2 percent and the second 
one a supplementary increase of 35 percent (IGSS, 2009: 201).  The adjustments to real wages have 
been  developed  in  parallel  with  the  introduction  of  the  extremely  generous  LTCI  and  two  other 
allowances for the elderly, providing elderly dependents with a large scope of provisions without any 
out-of-pocket money plus a health insurance asking for an out-of-pocket money of 5 percent only. 
                                                           
33Given the high replacement rate of legal pensions, the sector of private pension developped in a 
minor way (Victor, 2009). 
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Since the Eighties, the group of contributors has increased more than that of pensioners providing 
Luxembourg  with  an  extremely  favourable  old  age  dependency  ratio,  which  is  currently  38.6 
pensioners / 100 contributors (2008) as compared to 48.6 in 1980 (IGSS, 2009: 198). The same ratio 
for the public sector amounted to 61.4 in 1980, 51.6 in 2005 The difference between the general and 
the public sector is due to a predominantly national
34 public sector which undergo the well known 
ageing effects of other affluent MS.. 
 
Graph 2: Evolution of the average number of contributors and of pensioners 
 
Source: IGSS, 2009: 197 
If there is not a similar continuous increase of contributors, i.e. of active persons (residents and non-
residents, nationals or foreigners), the current „healthy‟ financial situation will change in future as  
immigrants age. Furthermore cross border commuters will require their rights to a full pension or the 
equivalent  segment  for  the  years  they  have  worked  in  Luxembourg  according  to  international 
regulations. 
The impact of foreigners on revenues is extraordinary: “En comparant le total des impôts et des 
cotisations  sociales  retenus  sur  la  rémunération  des  frontaliers  entrants  au  total  des  prestations 
revenant  aux  non-résidents,  il  ressort  des  excédents  annuels  très  substantiels  en  faveur  du 
Luxembourg (Bulletin du STATEC 03_2010: 150). One also observes a growing share of payments 
transfered abroad: 20.1 percent in 2008 as compared to 12.1 in 1990, 15.9 percent in 2000 and 18.2 
percent  in  2005    (IGSS,  2009:  201;  table  4).  This  will  continue  to  increase  considerably  in  the 
upcoming years given the supranational regulations.  
 
                                                           













4.2.1.  Supranational and national legal framework 
Under EU regulations, the former active EU citizen is entitled to the pro rata of the years s/he was 
active in Luxembourgwith or another MS. On top of this, Luxembourg - as well as other EU-MS - has 
signed social security treaties with numerous non-EU nations (e.g.  US, Cape Verde, former Republic 
of Yugoslavia) that allow former employees to receive full or partial credit for their contributions, 
once they are back in their own or another country. 
 
Some  elements  like  the  right  to  a  minimum  pension  stipulated  within  EU  legislation  (art.  7  of 
regulation 1612/68) concern those with low wages and mixed careers in at least two MS. Retired EU 
immigrants who remain in Luxembourg, are entitled to the minimum pension of the MS of residence. 
In the case of a previous low wage in another or other MS(s), hence a „mixed‟ career, Luxembourg is 
obliged    to  complement  the  pro  rata  from  the  other  MS(s)
35  in  order  to  reach  the  level  of  
Luxembourg‟s minimum pension, which is the highest minmum pension scheme in EU by attributing 
the “compl￩ment pensions mininima” (regulation 1612/68, art. 7). In a high wage MS this can either 
have a positive sustaining effect for health insurance in the case of a return / the choice of another MS 
or a negative effect with those remaining in Luxembourg.  
Table 7: minimum pension schemes in some EU-MS (Missoc, 2008): 
MS  Minimum pension/month 
Luxembourg (highest in EU 27)  1.448,58 
Denmark  928,90 
Belgium  -- 
France   633,60  
Germany  -- 
Portugal (biggest group of immigrants in LU)  407,41 
Latvia  (lowest in EU-27)  108,00 
Missoc: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do 
 
The payment of the “compl￩ments pensions minima” weighs on the budget of the CNAP, however  
only with 3.3 percent (4.0) of the total expenditure in 2008 (2002). 
 
                                                           
35 E.g. if a Portuguese worker had worked over 10 years in his country of origin and 30 years in Luxembourg, 
the prorata from Portugal will be lower than the equivalent Luxembourgish prorata would be. The difference 
has to be paid by the CNAP 27 
 
4.2.2.  Financial balance 
Despite high replacement rates  which have been permanently increased, the financial situation is 
currently  very  solid  given  the  high  impact  of  migrants  and  cross  border  commuters  with  a 
predominant positive age effect.  Thus the general pension scheme presented a substantial reserve of 
3.6 years in 2008. Migration and cross border movement had a permanent positive impact on the 
receipts with proportionnally modest consumptions.  
Table 8: courant operations 
















70  94 571,4        117 328,0        22 756,6 
19
75  196 331,7  15,7%  7,9%  235 746,7  15,0%  7,2%  39 415,1 
19
80  362 395,5  13,0%  6,4%  412 519,6  11,8%  5,3%  50 124,1 
19
85  517 304,2  7,4%  1,8%  618 717,4  8,4%  2,9%  101 413,2 
19
90  781 881,0  8,6%  6,6%  993 309,4  9,9%  7,9%  211 428,4 
19
95  1 265 694,8  10,1%  6,9% 
1  449 
954,0  7,9%  4,7%  184 259,3 
                       
19
96  1 309 423,2  3,5%  2,6% 
1  482 
576,8  2,2%  1,4%  173 153,6 
19
97  1 411 927,1  7,8%  5,4% 
1  586 
369,8  7,0%  4,6%  174 442,7 
19
98  1 443 607,9  2,2%  2,0% 
1  686 
593,2  6,3%  6,1%  242 985,2 
19
99  1 509 763,3  4,6%  3,5% 
1  798 
556,6  6,6%  5,5%  288 793,3 
20
00  1 567 815,4  3,8%  1,1% 
2  028 
314,2  12,8%  9,8%  460 498,8 
20
01  1 695 595,7  8,2%  4,9% 
2  315 
128,2  14,1%  10,7%  619 532,5 
2002  1 981 036,7  16,8%  14,5%  2  388  3,2%  1,1%  407 309,4 28 
 
*  346,2 
20
03  2 015 803,1  1,8%  -0,3% 
2  501 
530,1  4,7%  2,6%  485 727,0 
2004
**  2 229 130,6  10,6%  8,3% 
2  627 
720,9  5,0%  2,9%  398 590,3 
20
05  2 264 488,5  1,6%  -0,9% 
2  798 
570,4  6,5%  3,9%  534 081,9 
20
06  2 388 122,7  5,5%  3,3% 
3  023 
493,6  8,0%  5,8%  635 370,9 
20
07  2 487 196,9  4,1%  1,8% 
3  303 
755,0  9,3%  6,8%  816 558,1 
20
08  2 640 830,6  6,2%  4,0% 
3  491 
426,0  5,7%  3,5%  850 595,4 
Source: IGSS, 2009: 202.  Included in expenses in 2002: contributions for baby-year: * and in 2004: 
transfer of 130 mill € to the health insurance: ** 
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The positive saldo increases steadily, producing the aforementioned reserve – 
despite important adjustments. In 2002, the increase of expenditure was due to 
the introduction of baby years introduced within a special round of tripartite 
negotiations, the so called “Rentendësch”
36. The quite low increase of revenues 
in  2002  is  probably  due  to  the  stagnating  of  the  employment  increase, 
following an economic downturn in 2000/01.  Another significant growth of 
expenditure in 2004 is due to the transfer of 130 mill € to the health insurance 
covering the aforementioned deficit of the health insurance (cf. p. 13).   
 
Graph 3: Evolution of revenues, expenditure and the reserve 
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36 a negotiation round of a tripartite committee which, on top of high replacement rates, introduced a new 
measure for the child rearing of non-active women: act of 28 June 2002. 30 
 
For pension schemes, the current reserve as well as the current positive dependency ratio (which will 
deteriorate on parallel with the „withdrawing‟ cross border commuters) will still maintain a solid 
balance  however  with  a  „Rentenmauer‟
37  which  might  approach  quicker than  foreseen,  given  the 
decrease of employment.   
There is a broad awareness about the link between important contributions by foreigners and the high 
provisions for pension schemes:  often the press  highlights the sustaining effects of migration. 
 
4.2.3.  Reforms in the light of the financial crisis 
With the reform of “statut unique” (act of 13 May 2008), the four former professionally organised
38 
non  civil  serva nt  pension  insurances  were  merged  into  one   scheme,  the  “Caisse  Nationale 
d‟Assurance  Pension”  (CNAP).  The  four  former  legal  schemes  for  civil  servants  have  not  been 
included – just as for health insurance
39.  
 
Pension schemes were discussed during the recent tripartite negotiations (spring 2010), wich  failed in 
2010. The measures introduced by the government  during the following weeks concern pensions: 
Adjustments have been frozen for the  coming years. However, if one look s into all the measures 
reacting to the effects of the financial crisis and the household‟s deficit, many of them aim at child 
rearing benefits
40 and pensions of the elderly have not been  concerned to the same extent. The shift 
away from social transfer payments  abroad to a more substantial co-financing of services for the 
resident  population  (e.g.  child  care)  has  been  highlighted  by  unions,  the  press  and  by  different 
political  parties  with  varying  positive  or  negative  criticism  concerning  the  loss  of  cross  border 
commuters. The crucial condition for this shift is the residence condition in the EU legislation. The 
shift from exported transfers to services for the residents might also be seen with regard to electoral 
reasoning for the predominantly national elderly (Pierson 2001, Schmidt, 2002). 
 
In conclusion, we observe a moderate cost-containment measure, no recalibration, a financial balance 
which is still solid and which is due to the permanently rejuvenating affect of incoming foreigners.  
 
 
                                                           
37 A colloquial expression for the moment when – in the near or far future  – expenditure will exceed revenues 
due to a future less favourable age structure of the contributors. 
38 “assurance  contre vieillesse  et l’invalidité des ouvriers (AVI”,  “caisse de pension des employés privés”, 
“caisse de pension des artisans”, and “caisse de pension agricole”. 
39 For civil servants and employees of the State, for civils servants and emplyees of municipalities, for agents of 
the national railway, and for employees of public agencies. 
40 Aiming at families more than at the elderly might be explained by high child benefits and the child benefit 
exportation aimed at cross border commuters and children abroad. The introduced measures will reduce the 
export of child benefits and finance services which are, to a larger extent, aiming at the resident population. 31 
 
4.3. Care insurance 
Luxembourg has one of the most generous and expensive long term care insurances within EU (Di 
Bartolomeo, 2008: 22).  In January 1999 (act of 19 June 1998) the “assurance dependence” replaced 
the former system of care services at home which were financed by authorities and an„out-of-pocket 
money‟  by  those  who  were  in  need  of  help.  The  price  to  be  paid  for  delivered  provisions  was 
calculated according to the composition of the household and its income – just like for other services 
in Luxembourg, e.g. child care services.  
The long term care insurance (LTCI) became a mandatory branch of Social Security. As opposed to 
the  insurances  launched  at  the  beginning  of  20
th  century  alongside  the  Bismarckian  corporatist 
principles,  LTCI  differs  with  regard  to  two  principles.  First,  LTCI  was  initially  conceived  as  a 
universal    insurance,  leaving  behind  the  corporatist  professional  categories,  including  also  civil 
servants. And secondly employers do not contribute to LTCI in order not to hamper the economy‟s 
performance – a liberal principle. Contributors (those insured with health insurance: active or retired) 
contribute 1,4 percent of all their incomes (wages, revenue, pensions, income from inheritance) since 
January  2007.  Between  1999  and  December  2006,  contributions  were  fixed  at  1  percent.  Since 
January 2007, the State‟s contribution has been fixed to 140 mill € / year, which constituted 40 
percent of the expenditure in 2009
41 and the contribution rate ha d been increased. CNS draws up 
budgets and controls expenditure of the LTCI. 
For a home-based dependent person, the LTCI pays for the help and care given by a care network or 
by a semi-stationary centre via benefits in kind. The long term care insurance also acknowledges 
services provided by an informal carer (family member e.g.) via a benefit in cash. Thus both types of 
benefits can be used in parallel by those who are fully insured with Luxembourg‟s social security. 
For a dependent person within a care institution, the long term care insurance pays for the services 
provided by a professional network taking over various types of assistance via benefits in kind. 
The monetary value of services provided by professional networks for assistance at home is currently 
€ 57,62 / hour and in institutions for the elderly € 44,80 /hour. The maximum cash benefit for the 
informal carer is 262,50/week (since March 2009).  In cases of a maximal need of assistance, the 
expenditure of LTCI for persons at home with „only‟ professional assistance is € 2.362,42/week and 
in an institution € 1.859,20/week
42. These provisions are outstanding in an international comparison 
(Hartmann-Hirsch, 2007) 
As opposed to health insurance, there is no out -of pocket money for delivered provisions for the 
dependent person as long as s/he accepts the care plan by CNS. A Household‟s contributions to LTCI 
                                                           
41 Both changes had been proposed by the “Comité de coordination tripartite” in 2006  and implemented via 
the act of 22 December 2006 “Tripartite” (art. 34 and 35;  cf art. 375 and 376 of Code des Assurances Sociales). 
42 In extremely heavy cases, this can be enlarged to 56.5 h/week, thus 3.255,53/week at home (full 
professional help). 32 
 
draw on more than wages and benefits, and are more bound to residence than is the case for health 
and pension insurances.  
 
For the whole argument on contributors and their composition, we refer to the section on health 
insurance  –  given  a  similar  work  related  legal  membership  with  similar  effects  and  the  age 
dependency ratio. With regard to the EU residence stipulations for cross border commuters, LTCI 
benefits, to an even higher extent, from contributions and an extremely low share of consumptions 
than is the case for health insurance.  
4.3.1 Supranational and national legal framework 
With regard to the former regulation 1408/71, care insurances were not yet part of it, due to their 
recent development. However since care insurances or allowances for the elderly/disabled came into 
force, the CJEU operates as a preliminary legislator. 
Some major stipulations should be mentioned here as they have a direct impact on the sustainability 
of LTCI. 
The judgement of the Court (CJEU) „Molenaar and AOK‟ (case C – 160/96) stipulates that “even if 
they (benefits of German “Pflegeversicherung”) have their own characteristics, such benefits must be 
regarded as „sickness benefits‟ (art. 4(1) (a) of regulation 1408/71) (25). Furthermore, they have to be 
considered as a “sickness insurance „cash benefit‟” (36).  Cash benefits are exportable according to 
art. 19 (1/b) of regulation 1408/71.  
MS are entitled to require contributions by those who work on their territory but reside in another MS: 
cross border commuters (cf. Molenaar and AOK; case C – 160/96). 
 
Insured persons who live abroad and are still insured with Luxembourg‟s health insurance and hence 
LTCI have two options. Either they award the benefits in kind of the country of residence and the 
competent country (e.g. Luxembourg) pays for it afterwards  or they ask for the cash benefit to CNS 
in Luxembourg “even  if the legislation of the State [of current residence] does not  provide for 
benefits of that type” (judgement C – 160/96 (38). Abroad, cash benefit and benefits in kind cannot be 
provided together. This is again a win-win situation for Luxembourg: benefits in kind in other MS 
than Luxembourg weigh less on the budget of LTCI than services provided by LTCI in Luxembourg 
(cf. monetary value above). 
 
Again  according  to  European  legislation,  Luxembourg  as  a  high  wage  country  wins  out  of  its 
important share of cross border commuters who are obliged to contribute fully, but are not fully 
eligible for provisions (not eligible for benefits in kind) and who are, on average, younger. Hence 
these  same  groups  are  less  likely  to  be  currently  and  in  the  near  future  in  need.  The  European 
residence  condition  is  the  crucial  disposal  which  allows  national  authorities  to  benefit  of  full 33 
 
contributions and to offer provisions partly only. The impact of this disposal is significant with a 
strong group of foreigners, representing more than half of the contributors; returning migrants and, in 
any case, cross border commuters are net contributors. 
Authorities observe immigrants arriving at the end of their career. They enjoy full health and care 
insurance through the work related Bismarckian membership. They will consume LTCI after some 
contributing  years  only;  hence  their  potential  consumption  might  be  higher  than  that  of  the,  on 
average, younger other foreigners.  
 
Generally speaking, cross border commuters as well as immigrants contribute fully during the years of 
their professional career in Luxembourg. Returning to their country, they are awarded only a modest 
part of the existing benefits/services provided in Luxembourg.    
 
4.3.2. Financial situation 
The evolution of LTCI has been outstanding. We will demonstrate this on the basis of the evolution of 
human resources since 1999; a radical change has taken place whereby women ceased to be the main 
carers for the elderly (Pierson, 2001):  
 
Table 9 : Human resources 
 
Human resources  2001  2002  2005  2006  2007  2008 
professional  care  
(FTE) 
4.095,5  4.479,4  5.801,2  6.166,6  6.564,8   
Increase   + % 60.3% 
Informal carers  2.919  3.446  4.445  4.584  4.607  4.752 
Increase  + 62,8% 
FTE: full time equivalent 
 
With an increase of more than 60 percent between 2001
43 and 2007 / 2008, this sector of long term 
care experienced a significant evolution, which would not have been feasible without the equivale nt 
increase of contributors (cf. table 4) and a high performing economy. 
 
The emergence of this service sector led to an unknown degree of „defamilization‟ in a previously a 
profoundly catholic society (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Mainly within the child care sector, authorities 
considered the public offer as a subsidiary one, which should help those who are not able to cope with 
                                                           
43 we leave out the first two years of a new scheme, when the administration had to cope with an unusual 
number of applications 34 
 
the family‟s responsibility; thus, responsibility was mainly with parents. The increase and the high 
degree of professionalization of both sectors produced a withdrawel by the family. More and more 
responsibility is shifted from the family to the State.  
 
With the evolution of the financial situation, we observe the same phenomenon of an astonishing 




Table 10: financial evolution of LTCI (source: IGSS) 
 
 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
REVENUES 
                 
 
Contributions  by 
households 
89  815 
701 
99  794 
103 
112  749 
972 
122  070 
388  130 602 015 
138  768 
298 
148  145 
723 
158  210 
465 
234  809 
880 
256  034 
504 
Contribution  by 
households 
1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.4%  1.4% 
State’s 
contribution 
69  410 
187 
64  223 
730  84 294 962 
83  525 
695  100 118 401 
112  690 
896 
137  923 
118 
149  408 
420 
140  000 
000 
140  000 
000 
Energy sector 
3 141 873  2 391 219  2 797 735  4 176 928  3 792 895  4 435 852  3 926 486  2 184 298  1 582 686  1 751 996 
Other revenues 
  Prélèvement  à  la 
réserve  0  0  0 
10  022 
376  0  0  0  0  0 
26  766 
036 
Découvert  de 
l'exercice  0  0  0  0  0 
22  295 
333  13 515 709 
19  517 
789  0  0 
TOTAL  of 
REVENUES 
163  301 
775 
258  117 
254 
320  630 
149 
325  360 
069  308 417 351 
317  301 
908 
380  180 
110 
379  700 
922 
472  866 
633 
580  834 
508 
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 EXPENDITURE                              
Administrative 
cost  2 280 620  2 641 240  2 464 678  2 403 567  3 185 122  3 034 374  4 032 008  4 066 409  4 449 522 
5 591 565 
                               
Cash benefit 
28  529 
076 
19  055 
511  13 082 512 
12  052 
149  9 386 073  9 685 044  8 927 802  8 276 410  7 762 633 
7 223 334 
                   
 
Benefits in kind 
20  737 
923 
84  874 
522 
168  544 
631 
219  252 
336  217 501 250 
231  945 
457 
306  156 
128 
290  034 
541 
























LTCI cash benefit 
 
7 128 654  18 332 637 
26  564 
463  30 602 659 
35  595 
467  57 756 844 
50  525 
172 
50  385 
311 
46  821 
089 
Benefits abroad
44  -  2 354 991  4 660 468  2 865 263  5 520 764  4 682 557  8 701 607  8 235 137  9 586 201  9 197 166 
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE 
163  301 
775 
258  117 
254 
320  630 
149 
335  382 
445  308 417 351 
339  597 
241 
393  695 
819 
399  218 
712 
472  866 
633 
607  600 
544 
                                                           
44 This includes cash benefits transfered abroad and payments according to international conventions (for cross border commuters, for a temporrary stay, for services 
provided within E 112, etc.). 37 
 
 
The increase of revenues amounted to 128 percent and that of expenditure to 89 percent between 2001 
and 2008
45. 
The necessity to increase the contribution by households might be explained with the “d￩couvert de 
l‟exercice” of the previous years. As a consequence, an immediate change can be observed in 2007, 
when revenues increased beyond expenditure. Given the positive evolution of the institutional and the 
home  care  sector  developped  by  around  60  percent  during  8  years
46,  already in 2004 , current 
expenditure exceeded revenues producing a reduction of the reserve even with the „net‟ benefit of the 
extraordinary input by young foreigners. In 2007, the increase of the contribution‟s rate produced an 
equilibrium followed by another down-turn in 2008. OECD (2008: 108s) highlights the endangered 
sustainability of the LTCI with current and even more so future spendings for the necessarily ageing 
foreigners. According to the current EU law, cross border commuters however will only be entitled to 
the cash benefit and will not be eligible for the  more expensive benefits in kind. 
 The section “cash benefits” decreased from 1999 to 2008. This concerns the former two allowances 
for elderly and disabled (acts of 22 May 1989 and of  16 April 1979). With the launching of LTCI, 
users  of those  allowances  could either  continue  with  them  or  ask  for  LTCI  and  hence  renounce 
entitlement for the former regimes. No new allowance has been granted anymore. 
One of the budget lines within expenditure concerns the “cash benefit” of LTCI: the increase of the 
cash benefit is in line with one of the main objectives: to privilege care at home as compared to 
institutional care. 
Expenditure abroad constitutes 1.4 percent of the total of expenditure, whilst cross border commuters 
constitute 44 percent of the contributors (cf. www.statec.lu: 2008). This demonstrates the win-win 






   
                                                           
45 We leave out the first two years due to a slower pace at the beginning. 
46 cf. Evolution of HR in table 9; cf. also table 4.5 for long term care beds in OECD, 2008: 110.  





4.3.3. Reforms – in the light of the crisis?  
 
 (i) A first major reform of the act of 19 June 1998 took place in 2005, entering into force on 1
st 
January 2007: the act of 23 December 2005. The draft bill (n. 5146) had been introduced in June 
2003.  The  following  objectives  have  been  implemented  with  the  adoption  of  this  draft  bill:  to 
privilege rehabilitation instead of long term care, home instead of institutional care, benefits in kind 
instead of benefits in cash and to provide continuous care.  These objectives were initial ones and 
were hence confirmed with the draft bill (5164) and the act of 23 December 2005. 
Some measures aim at improving the existent provisions: control and promotion of quality of the care 
(via “commission de qualit￩ des prestations” ) have been introduced. The threshold of entry has been 
eased for adaptations of the flat/house; maximum hours for benefits in kind in the case of care at 
home have been enlarged. Other measures aim at cost containment: the monetary value of the cash 
benefit for the informal carer has been fixed at the level of 25,00 €/hour; fees for the replacement of 
the informal carer have been cutback. For ordinary cases in institutional care, household tasks have 
been abolished; in extraordinary cases, a cutback provides with a maximum of 1.5 hours/week for this 
task as compared to the former 2.5 hours/week. 
Following  the  proposals  of  tripartite  2006,  another  draft  bill  (n.  5611)  had  been  introduced  in 
September 2006 aiming at two major measures: the increase of the contribution rate from 1.0 to 1.4 
percent and the freezing of the State‟s contribution to 140 million € in order to increase revenues and 
to contain an otherwise potentially excessive increase of the State‟s input to LTCI. The law was 
adopted on 22 December 2006. The increase of household‟s contributions resulted in an increase of 
nearly 50 percent between 2006 and 2007
48 as compared to 7 percent between 2005 and 2006 with an 
average increase of contributors of approximately 3 .4 percent (table 5). This should provide users 
with the “right to a high level of benefits” (Di Bartolomeo, 2008: 22). As the minister pronounced at 
this  conference,  “The  choice  was  made  to  limit  the  State‟s  participation  and,  in  return,  to  raise 
deductions charged to insured individuals. This was not an insignificant increase. Individuals accepted 
the change without any great display of protest and dissatisfaction.” (ibid., p. 22). This cutback did 
obviously not produce a dramatic change and “blame avoidance” strategies (Pierson, 1996) which are 
used within other welfare cutback measures in other MS were not even needed (Schmidt, 2002): there 
was little debate in the press. Might this be due to the generally very generous provisions and the low 
contribution rates? 
Both modifications have taken place before the emergence of the financial crisis within the context 
of an increasing labour force. 
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 (ii)  The  Rapport  de  stratégie  nationale  (2008:  90  –  92)  presents  different  elements  of  the 
aforementioned modified act of 2005 such as the “commission de qualit￩” plus  a study aiming at the 
satisfaction of users at home (CEO, 2007), which demonstrates the intention  of authorities to satisfy 
the users‟ needs and wishes to a maximum extent. 
 (iii) During the recent quadripartite negotiations on health insurance, the LTCI has only been 
mentioned regarding the reduction of the reserve from a minimum of 10 percent to 5.5 percent. In the 
case of problems of liquidity, the  CNS could rely on the reserve of the LTCI. But no cutback measure 
concerned the LTCI directly.  
 (iv) During the tripartite negotiations in spring 2010, LTCI has not been mentioned.  
 
 
Obviously, most of the the reforms implemented since 1999 have not been inspired by the economic 
crisis the main quality objectives of the LTCI were confirmed; an important share of modifications 
aimed at an improvement. However, there were also measures aiming at cost containment, some of 
them within the draft bill n. 5164 introduced in 2003 and others with the draft bill n. 5611 introduced 
in December 2006 for the modification of LTCI. All of them have been taken before the economic 
crisis. 
Since  that  reform,  there  is  and  was  no  political  debate  on  the  LTCI.  There  is  an  understanding 
concerning the sustaining contributions by cross border commuters as compared to their spendings for 
LTCI (articles in the press aiming at an educated public). But also this aspect is more discussed for the 
purpose of pension insurance than for LTCI. The difference between the 1.4 percent of exported 
spendings  compared  to  the  44  percent  of  non-residents‟  contributions  has  been  quoted
49.  The 
aforementioned gap  allowed authorities to develop  the service sector, which aims at the residents 
only.  
 
Concluding, one can say that LTCI – even with its outstanding provisions, which are not really 
perceived  as  outstanding  –  has  not  been  questioned  during  the  recent  debates  aiming  at  cost 
containment after the financial crisis. The enlargement of measures for the elderly rely on massive 
inputs by, on average, younger foreigners and a future take-up which is and will remain limited due to 
the current EU legislation. With the introduction of the LTCI, Luxembourg managed an important 
recalibration via an outstanding increase of social services, responding to the increased female labour 
force participation. Defamilization took place in a profoundly catholic society.  Cost containment has 
never really been tackled: the introduction of an out-of-pocket money has never been discussed. That 
might have produced more important efforts in terms of legitimation discourse or negotiation, given a 
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quite broad national electoral share of the elderly. The increase of the contribution rate has been 
negotiated within the usual „corporatist‟ social partnership committees.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
As opposed to other MS, Luxembourg‟s corporatist welfare model with its  univeralistic objectives  is 
outstanding  with  regard  to  several  aspects:  expansion  and  improvement  trends  going  beyound 
Scandinavian standards have been implemented. Important reserves, mainly for the pension insurance 
allowed authorities to higher the replacement rates to top levels within OECD countries. In this highly 
budgetised system, corporatist elements have been reduced in favour of a higher impact of the State. 
The emergence and meanwhile the existence of an outstanding service sector for the elderly (and for 
children)  demonstrates  significant  recalibration  efforts  and  results.  This  responded  to  a  new 
composition  of  the  labour  force  with  an  increased  female  participation,  enhancing  an  important 
societal  change  (Pierson,  2001).  Child  care  services  concern  more  immigrants  than  nationals  as 
immigrant women have higher employment rates than their national equivalents. Services for the 
elderly  concern  more  nationals.  A  clear  social-democratic  shift  from  family‟s  to    State‟s 
responsability has thus been implemented. Defamilzation took place within a profoundly corporatist, 
catholic country.  Predominant transfer provisions were slightly cutback in favour of a broader service 
offer financed to a higher extent by authorities. In conclusion a significant recalibration aimed at 
expansion and improvement took place, moving the former corporatist model to a more and more 
universalistic Scaninavian system. 
Moderate  cost  containment  has  been  implemented  for  the  health  insurance,  very  moderate  cost 
containment for the LTCI (plus an increase of revenues) and for the pension-schemes. Up to now, 
authorities did not really need to develop “blame avoidance” discourses  in order to legitimate e.g. the 
increase of contribution rates (LTCI). No re-commodification took place for residents, as this was the 
case  within  other  liberal  or  other  corporatist  systems.  Cross  border  commuters  are  currently 
undergoing  a  significant  re-commodification  with  regard  to  restricted  and  not  compensated  child 
benefits. The residence condition is the crucial stipulation wihtin this change as well as within other 
EU stipulations which are favourable for Luxembourg.  
Luxembourg  offers  equity  with  middle  class  standards.  Efficiency  is  the  problematic  aspect  for 
corporatist regimes, as for Luxembourg. The high inactivity rates with early exit patterns and low 
female  labour  force  participation  do  not  providethe  necessary  contributions,  but  challenge  the 
sustainability of the model with insufficient revenues and higher consumption. Considering the State 
to  be  the  main  protector  and  using  early  exit  paths  is  a  typical  corporatist  attitude.  Up  to  now, 
foreigners compensated for nationals due to their higher labour force participation. With the  - more or 
less important – withdrawel of cross border commuters, the traditional corporatist  attitudes will gain 41 
 
importance  and  produce  decreasing  labour  force  participation  rates;  this  will  challenge  the 
sustainability of the insurances. Residents, mainly the long term residents experienced long years of a 
developping  and  improving  welfare  state;  this  will  not  ease  legitimation  negotiations  aiming  at 
retrenchment or recalibration with cost containment (e.g. measures aiming at late exit patterns). The 
launching of services can hardly be considered as a recalibration aimed at cost containment. There is 
no experience of cutbacks, radical recalibration and significant cost containment measures leading to 
losses and a higher individual responsability. A certain share of  the more active and „more efficient‟ 
cross border commuters might be gone, and an important share of the active immigrants are less 
challenged by „cutbacks‟ such as the increase of pension age as obviously they work, in any case, 
longer than nationals and were perhaps initially less influenced by corporatist patterns in their contrey 
of residence.  
 
We  observe  no  cutbacks  which  have  been  discussed  in  a  broad  way  –  with  exception  of  the 
contribution rate for employers for their manual workers (box 2). The increase of the contribution rate 
for the LTCI was accepted without protest and needed little legitimaton efforts. No liberalisation has 
taken place. The universalisation of national providers has been achieved for LTCI and is partly 
implemented for the health and pension insurances. Competition amongst providers has not yet been 
introduced.  
  
As a small nation-state, Luxembourg used its sovereignty taking advantage of the imbrication of 
national and transnational legislation, given its overwhelmingly transnational labour force with an, on 
average, younger thus less consuming group of contributors. Age- and family-member-dependency 
ratio are extremely low for cross border commuters compared to those of residents. Croos border 
commuters contribute fully and only enjoy in part the benefits. Exportability of cash benefits (social 
assistance) and some benefits in kind (LTCI) is limited or impossible for cross border commuters and 
returning migrants due to the European legislation.  The residence condition is the central disposal in 
the European legislation (regulation 1408/71), which produces a net gain in the case of a strong cross 
border mouvement and a returning migration, requiring full contributions and deleviering a modest 
part of benefits – the most evident case is LTCI with important contributions and extremely modest 
consumptions  by  cross  border  commuters.  It  is  the  vast  majority  of  active  non-nationals  which 
allowed  authorities  to  go  for  expansion  and  improvement  of  their  national  welfare  system, 
incorporating them according to a suprantional legal framework with a limited access to the entire 
scope of benefits. Migration and cross border movement within an interesting imbrication of national 
and supranational legislation did not produce a supplementary charge, but were the motor for the 
„virtuous spiral‟ of the welfare model.    
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The  financial  crisis    was  not  immediately  followed  by  a  significant  decrease  of  employment; 
unemployment always lags behind; the decrease became evident in 2009 only. On top of this, the 
unemployment of cross border commuters is not directly evident, as they are not registered and not 
paid for in Luxembourg. The decrease of employment and mainly that of cross border commuters had 
and will still have an important impact with its triple effect. The loss of cross border commuters will 
have  a  negative  impact  on  the  balance  of  Luxembourg‟s  corporatist  employment  linked  welfare 
insurances.    The  discussion  concerning  eventual  cutbacks  started  only  seriously  with  the  current 
tripartite negotiations in spring 2010.  
 
All this takes place in corporatist tri- and quadripartite negotiations and counseling bodies, where up 
to now, employers‟ and employees‟ organisations found a compromise mediated by the Government. 
The negotiation modus relies on strong legitimating procedures, which at the end achieve a consensus 
backed-up by nearly all political actors; this was the case for expansion policies. The last tripartite 
negotiations did not succeed given a first experience with still moderate, but retrenchment measures,  
an  unknown  and    thus  inacceptable  experience  mainly  for  unions.  Employers  demonstrated  the 
growing loss of competitiveness and unions argued against any potential „Sozialabbau‟. Both partners 
could not find a compromise.  And the government seems to be challenged as a main actor for future 
months. 
 
Two factors are commonly highlighted which put welfare systems under pressure: globalisation and 
ageing effects. Luxembourg avoided the last one via its permanently rejuvenating immigration and 
cross border mouvement. The extremely transnationalised labour force might be considered as an 
implicit „globalising‟ answer with an economy which is run by “transnationals” on the basis of – 
probably – more transnational than national patterns. Immigration and cross border movement, which 
are sometimes considered to be a threat to the sustainability of welfare schemes, where the main 
factors for expansion  and improvement, for the outstanding evolution of this welfare model. 
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